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ARGUMENT ONE
f 1efenctants/Respondents
1, .•

begin their presentation of

c;uggesting that the Plaintiffs/Appellants nor either
a

cornoration nor a registered assumed

On page 2, of the Defendants/Respondents brief, is the
fullowing.
The Plaintiff, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., is
not (emphasis original) a registered corporation, nor
rs-it a rec;istered "d/b/a", let alone authorized to do
business in the State of Utah . .
If this were true, then the lower Court could have
summarily disposed of this matter, pursuant to 42-2-10 of the
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1963, which states:
42-2-10. Penalties. Any person or persons who shall
carry on, conduct or transact any such business under
an assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this act shall not sue, prosecute or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, cross complaint
or proceeding of any of the courts of this state until
the provisions of this chapter have been complied with.
However, the Plaintiffs/Appellants are properly registered
with the State of Utah, Secretary of State, and there was never any
mention or allegation of the

to the contrary, at any time

Juring the lower court proceedings.
At this point to suggest that the Plaintiffs/Appellants
were not properly registered is merely an attempt to divert this
l.c.·1n

's attention f'rorn the real issues of this case.

lr>c E.
1

Especially

it was never raised before, when the same would have been

l1spnsitive before.

-1-

l'l1ere
I 1 1,,1 ·

was no evidence to show that the Plaintiffs/

•.1ere not properly registered, consistent with the

,, r
/ lo

that the Plaintiffs/Appellants were at all times
this action, properly registered with the Sec-

,,.,;-"" 1•f State,

for the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT Tl•JO

Defendants/Respondents suggest that there was a
unilateral change on the costs of construction of the "packaged home."
On page 3 of their brief, they state:
When the oral agreement was reduced to writing, the erection cost was unilaterally changed by
Plaintiffs to $3,850.00 which was $1,350.00 more
than the original price of $2,500.00 (See exhibits
5-P and 17-1').
Plaintiffs/Appellants would think that the Defendants/
Respondents would be too ashamed to make such an assertion.
According to the testimony of Charles Chapman both
in his deposition and in Court, there were conversations about
the costs for erecting the "packaged home" for some $2,500.00.
As the negotiations continued, extras were included, and so
nhen the matter was reduced to writing, the face amount on
the contract was $3,850.00.
Chapman signed the first part of the agreement, calling for the increased amount of materials supplied but appar"'ir l

•1

rlid not sign the second page calling for additional

.a,ls of labor.

The Plaintiffs/Appellants did not notice

the same, until it was time to collect and there was a dispute.
However, the Defendant Chapman said nothing about it
at the time, and continued to induce the Plaintiffs/Appellants
-2-

'"" :ouant to the written contract, fully expecting to
t lw
rl

odme on the Plaintiffs/Appellants after all of

1.1CJ.::>

done.

At the time of the said contract calling for the
r'o'1mc>nC of $3,850.00, no work had been done.
·s1,Jn

Defendant Chap-

stated in his deoosition and in trial that he was aware

that the Plaintiffs/Appellants were expecting to be paid the
full $3,850.00 for his labor, as the document stated, but

he Chapman, remained silent about his wanting the same done
for $2,500.00, and expressly stated that he was going to
the matter up, only after the work had been done.
Quite apparently, the jury could see through the
dishonesty in the same, just as the Defendants/Respondents
were trying to avoid a just debt, by denying the arrangements with the Plaintiffs/Appellants to act as his own contractor and have them work for him.

Then when all of the

work was done, Defendants/Respondents could claim that they
dict not know and hence, get something for nothing, and
use the licensing statute as "an unwarranted shield for the
avoidance of a just obligation."

Note Whipple vs. Fuller,

29Y P,2d 837, Utah, 1956, at pages 838 and 839.
ARG1JMENT THREE

Defendants/Respondents suggest on page 5 of their
"•r1P[

that the major complaint with the Plaintiffs/Appellants

•'', 11ol

the fact that the latter was not licensed but was

because of the improDer construction.

-3-

I Jo

page 5, is the following:

Contrary to the statement made by Plaintiffs
!heir Brief, Defendants Answer and Counterclaim
is not premised solely on the fact that Plaintiffs
were unlicensed, but primarily because of improper
construction (R-ll, 012, 013, 014, 015 and 106)."
it1

Defendants/Respondents seem to be overlooking the
Special Verdict Instruction #2, which was drafted into the
said instructions at his insistance, which states:
(2) Do you find that the Plaintiff materially
complied with the plans, labor contract, material
contract, and mutually agreed to changes made by
the Plaintiff and the Defendant?
ANSWER

YES

NO

If it is Defendants/Respondents position that the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, granted the Directed
Verdict because the Plaintiffs/Appellants fell short of "materi·ally complying with the plans, labor contract, material contract,
and mutually agreed to changes made by the Plaintiff and the
Defendant," then the Court was clearly out of line.
Distributing, Inc., vs.

17 U 2d 375, 412

Note Efco
375,

Utah, (1966).
It is most critical to note the exhibits at this

point to consider what was required of the Plaintiffs/Appellants. In
doing so, Plaintiffs/Appellants suggest that they are flagrantly
The plans and specifications drawn by the
"',_hi Leet, employed by the Defendants/Respondents, have differing

di.rnPnsions on the foundation, and the supports underneath the

-4-

beginning with the foundation all of the way up

,1 ,

, I"

,

ab in to the roof, there are inconsistent provisions

i in:o

and specifications.

Now, as well as then, for the Defendants/Respondents
that because the Plaintiffs/Appellants did not
c"01pl\1 with all of the plans and specifications, is absurd.

Jhev could not, as a logical impossibility.

Much like a

married bachelor, a round triangle, it just could not happen.
However, the jury ended the matter for the parties.
The jury said that the Plaintiffs/Appellants did in fact
so comply, and from that point on it was not for the Court to
substitute its judgment for the jury, Appellants/Plaintiffs
respectfully submit.

ARGUMENT FOUR
The Defendants/Respondents suggest that the Plaintiffs/
Appellants were listed on the building permit as the contractor
as evidence that that is exactly what he claimed to be.
On page 10, of the Defendants/Respondents brief, is
the following:
The evidence additionally shows that Plaintiff
Kerry R. Hubble, was listed as the contractor on the
building permit (See Exhibit 28-D). . "
Defendants/Respondents failed to tell the Court,
however, that Mr. Hubble did not take out or apply for the
i'enn1 r ,
'1,,.

rm

nor did he know that Mr. Chapman, when he took out

said application for a building permit, had put the same
the application.

-5-

As noted in 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated, it is the
rakes out the permit, not necessarily what one writes

, I·,,
, 1,,

·;,;id

application for the same, that is controlling.

Mr. Chapman took out the permit, and that ends it.
Hence, he was the owner/contractor of the cabin, employing
Plaintiffs/Appellants, along with their crews.
ARGUMENT FIVE
Defendants/Respondents suggest that Mr. Chapman was
totally inexperienced in construction both of the following
reasons:

(1) that he was in the class of individuals to be

protected by the licensing statute, and (2) that he could
not be the owner/contractor for the building of his own
cabin.
Note page 4 of the Defendants/Respondents brief
and specifically page 12 wherein it states:
" . . . There is no question that defendants were
without any knowledge in the field of construction,
and therefore, were the exact type of individuals
to which the laws was enacted to protect . . . "
However, Plaintiffs/Appellants suggest that the
facts of this case are exactly the opposite, hence the matter
should have been submitted to the trier of fact, ie: the jury.
According to the exhibits, the Defendants/Respondents
employed their loved-one, who was an architect to help them
with this project.

In addition, the Defendants/Respondents, were going

i

1 <Jf lhe additional work on this cabin, outside

.-1nrk, which Mr. Chapman could not do because of

Hence, the Defendants/Respondents, were going to
do al I of

the plumbing, electrical, shingles, water proof-

in3, insulating, all interior work, etc.

So as a result,

for the Defendants/Respondents to suggest that "there is no
that the Defendants were without knowledge in the
field of construction and were the exact type of individuals
to which the law was enacted to protect . . . " could not be
furtber from the truth.
Plaintiffs/Appellants question the same, and so the
matter should have been submitted to the trier of fact, the
jury in this case.
CONCLUSION
The jury heard all of the evidence.

The parties

were fully and fairly allowed to present their respective
positions to the trier of fact, and the result of the same
should not be tampered with, unless justice so requires.
In the case of Berkeley Bank for Coops. vs. Meibos,
Utah, 607 P.2d 789, (1980), the Utah Supreme Court referred
to the age old law here in Utah, in the case of Campbell vs.
S3fcway

Stores, Inc, 15 U.2d 113, 117, 388 P.2d 409, 412,
When the parties have had a full and fair opportunity

-7-

present their cause, and the jury has rendered
verdict, it should not be interfered with unless
there appears some compelling reason why justice
Jemands that it be done.
lo

ils

Plaintiffs/Appellants submit that in this case to
set Lhe jury verdict aside is a gross injustice.

It turns

the licensing statute into "an unwarranted shield for the
avoidance of a just oblip;ation." Whipple vs. Fuller, infra.
Also note, Bigler vs. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co.
Utah, (1983)

P.2d

, Supreme Court opinion handed

down on August 23, 1983:
" . . . we dispose of the second assignment of error
first by adhering to well established standards of
review. A jury verdict must stand unless there is
no competent evidence to support it."
Particularly when a jury makes a special verdict,
this Court has consistently held that they should be upheld.
In the case of Stanger vs. Centenial Life Insurance,
Utah, (1983) Case No. 17757, handed down on August 11, 1983,
this Court stated:
In
the special verdicts in favor of the
plaintiffs, we will review the evidence in light
most favorable to the findings of the jury, Williams
vs. State Farm Ins. Co. 656 P.2d 966 (1982) and uphold them, so long as there is competent evidence
to sustain them. Time Connnercial Financing Corp.
vs. Davis, Utah, 657 P.2d 234 (1982) and cases
therein cited.
In this case, the jury was ?iven a special jury verdict
'"' different is sues.
'.·1l1et

One of the issues was the question of

her or not the work was completely done or supervised by

o licensed contractor.

Plaintiffs/Appellants submit that their determination
-8-

,,1,1

ii<'

dispositive of that issue.
this factor coupled with the fact that this was a

, ,

JP<'d home, purchased exclusively from the Plaintiffs/

,\pfJ"' l I ants, would mean that the only exposure that the
Defendants/Respondents would have would be for labor performed by the Plaintiffs/Appellants or their crews.
This is not like the Defendants/Appellants hired
the Plaintiffs/Appellants to do the work and buy the materials
as they do the same, and then submit some big bill at the
end.

Rather this is a case where the homeowner purchased

all of the materials and then engaged the Plaintiffs/Appellants
to put the same together for them.
Hence, they would have been in exactly the same position, had the Plaintiffs/Appellants been licensed.

Yet they

have chosen not to pay the Plaintiffs/Appellants for their
materials nor for the labor, and now stand before this Court
requestin>; that the licensing statute be used as "an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December,

1983.
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